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METRO'S 2015 FORECAST ON

THE IMPACT OF SOUTH/NORTH AND ASSOCIATED LIGHT RAIL LINES

August 10, 1998

This report is a written public summary of the computer forecast made by Metro for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on the most recent South/North Light Rail proposal. The numbers are taken directly from Metro's computer-generated peak hour "output" maps and Draft Alternative Analysis Findings, dated July 16, 1997, which was issued then as "Briefing Materials for JPACT, MPAC, and the Metro Transportation Planning Committee."

The forecast shows traffic volumes and transit ridership by "link" (section of road) in the weekday afternoon peak hour. These link volumes form the statistical foundation for just about everything in their Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)

This written summary and analysis of the Metro forecast are from numbers taken directly from Metro's computer-generated peak hour "output" maps for the following three conditions:

1994 -- "Existing" Condition with only East Side LRT;

2015 Committed -- With only East and West Side LRT lines and such few other projects for which funds are actually "committed" (this is the "no money for more LRT" case ); and

2015 Preferred -- This is the one with "Son of South/North Light Rail", now politically refined into FIVE new LRT lines:

1) a South Line forking to Oregon City,

2) a South Line forking to Clackamas Town Center,

3) a North Line to Vancouver,

4) a "Portland to Tigard/Tualatin via Route 217" line, and

5) an "Airport service from Hillsboro" line (??).

The "Portland to Tigard/Tualatin via Route 217" line would really be a fork off the West Side Line that would go be a "Southwest" stub line. Tri Met ridership numbers indicate both rail lines would be heavy losers.

The "express" trolley trip to the airport will be at under 15 MPH and involve a stopover at Gateway with no stewardesses or in-flight movies.

I. THE SUMMARY FORECAST

(1) Trips are all unlinked and one-way.

(2) Pure Auto Trips -- Auto Only; no transfer to transit.

(3) All Auto Trips include both Auto Only and Park & Ride.

(4) All Auto Trips include both Auto Only and Park & Ride. Non-All Auto trips include Walk-On Transit riders, Walkers, and Bicyclists only.

(5) All Transit Trips -- Walk-On plus Park & Ride.

(6) Walk-On Transit Trips -- no Auto trip involved.

(7) Vehicle Million Miles Traveled excludes trucks or external trips.

(8) VMT Per Person in Region.

(9) Congested Miles are the total of roadway sections in which the Volume/Capacity Ratio is over 0.8.

(10) Total of vehicular delay on "Congested Miles"

Preceding table conclusions

1) The slightly lower congestion under the "2015 Preferred" case (the one Metro favors) has little to do with Light Rail but rather seems to be due to an extra 400 miles of highway lanes as well as greatly increased bus service. These are the hidden ingredients why "More Light Rail" seems to work -- it ISN'T the Light Rail at all that's lowering congestion;

2) The overall system impacts of "2015 Preferred" (with the five new light rail lines) versus the much cheaper "2015 Committed" (with only the East and West Side light rail lines) are quite minimal and well within a reasonable margin of error;

3) The forecasted increase in Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) and VMT Per Capita under the "2015 Preferred" case (with the five LRT lines) would put that alternative in violation of State, Metro, and City transportation rules to reduce VMT;

4) The greater length of vehicle trips under the "2015 Preferred" case versus the cheaper "2015 Committed" case would also put that alternative in violation of State and Metro transportation rules;

Metro's estimated cost of constructing and financing the South/North and other LRT lines plus those extra 400 lane miles is billions more than the "Committed" case. Metro's "High Transit" case was given at $15 billion in total costs over 20-years.

What do we get for this $15 billion ?

1) The 2015 reduction in the share of auto trips with all the extra transit would be only 0.4% -- from 86.8% to 86.4%. This is because much of the increase in "transit" trips is from light rail-induced park and ride auto trips. The overall number of "Preferred" auto trips would be only 0.5% less than under "Committed" for 2015.

2) The savings in average peak period travel time for the typical motorist would come to $357 million per second for each of those 42 seconds the average motorist would save.

3) If one applies total cost only to the highway improvements made, the addition of 396 lane-miles to local highways would come to $37.9 million per lane-mile, about the same as Federal Highway's average capital cost per mile for six-lane urban freeways. south/north light would cost $100 million per mile.

4) In other words, if we excluded the transit element of the "Preferred" plan, we could construct 396 miles of new six-lane freeways for the same money to add to the 1,047 miles of 1994 freeways. Or we could add several times that in four-lane arterials over the 6,153 arterial miles had in 1994.

II. ANALYSIS OF THE METRO FORECAST

A. Traffic Increases

Metro's forecast clearly shows that the "South/North" Corridor would be better off without LRT. Their forecast shows that with their 2015 "Preferred" South/North, Airport, and Route 217 LRT lines there is higher traffic on already congested sections of I-5 in North Portland and Vancouver than there would be without the South/North LRT in the 2015 "Committed" case. There would be 5.6% more traffic crossing the Columbia River in peak hours than would be the case in 2015 without LRT. There would be 11-14% higher peak hour outbound volumes on I-5 South.

Nor would the impact of more light rail be better on other highways. Metro forecasts 7-11% higher outbound peak hour traffic on McLoughlin Boulevard in the Year 2015 under their "Preferred" case than under the 2015 "Committed" case. Traffic volumes eastbound on I-205 just east of I-5 are forecasted to be 21% higher under the "Preferred" case. Volumes on the Pacific Highway (99W) are forecasted to be 11% higher south of the Beaverton-Hillsdale Highway and much higher further southwest. Slightly more traffic would be added to Route 43 in Lake Oswego. Traffic is forecasted to be virtually the same with or without the addition of the South/North and Airport LRT lines on highways as Route 30, Marine Drive, and State Route 14 in Clark County.

Metro's forecast also shows that their "Preferred" case (with South/North, Route 217, and Airport LRT lines) would add more traffic to the both the Sunset Freeway and Banfield Freeway in 2015 than would the "Committed" case (without additional LRT lines).

All this higher peak hour traffic, coming on top of existing heavy traffic, must yield much higher congestion, longer delays, and higher air pollution. Where forecasted reductions in traffic are shown, they tend to be minuscule and might disappear altogether were more realistic assumptions made. More importantly, 2015 peak hour traffic under either 2015 case (i.e. with or without the new LRT lines) is forecast to be much higher than existing levels for most regional highways, especially in suburban areas.

Capacity severely limits traffic growth on congested highways during the peak hour. In non-peak hours, however, there is room for growth. Therefore, daily traffic growth would certainly be much larger than during peak hours (i.e. much larger than shown in the tables above). What used to be a peak hour has already spread to a three-hour peak period (3-6 PM) on several highways. By 2015, the afternoon peak period would likely span at least four hours, a condition prevaling in the most congested of urban areas such as New York or Los Angeles.

The range of 1994-2015 increases is shown for each table and is summarized below.

* The 1994-2015 range of increase includes Preferred and Committed Cases for 2015.

B. Traffic Level of Service

Traffic Level of Service by roadway link is color-coded on these output sheets. Links colored red are those in the "E" or "F" Level of Service range. Under these conditions the volume of traffic exceeds the supply of roadway capacity to handle that traffic. These have a volume/capacity ratio of 1.0 or higher in the peak hour.

With the billions to be "invested" in Metro's "Preferred" 2015 future in the name of reducing traffic congestion, one might expect to see a lot less red on the map for 2015 by adding all those new LRT lines. How does the much pricier "Preferred" case for 2015 stack up, highway link by link, against a "Committed" 2015 without more Light Rail ?

The answer is that nearly all links on nearly all highways have the same Level of Service under either 2015 cases: all those extra LRT lines make a negligible difference. This includes I-5, I-205, Route 26, the Sunset Freeway, the Banfield Freeway, Pacific Highway, the TV Highway, Barbur Boulevard, Route 224, Sandy Boulevard, McLoughlin Boulevard, and lesser roads. The "investment" yields no dividends; it is a sheer capital loss.

C. Total Trips at Screenlines With "Preferred" LRT Case

For most key highway points near the edges of the Urban Growth Boundary where a direct, readable comparison is available, both traffic and transit ridership are considerably higher in 2015 with the "Preferred" case (with South/North, Airport, and Route 217 LRT lines). This raises an important question. How can total person trips (both traffic and transit) in the peak hour be so much higher under the "Preferred" case at these key screenlines than under "Committed" case ? After all, are not both based on the same population and employment assumptions ?

It is clear that Metro is using a higher number of trips overall for trips entering and leaving the Urban Growth Boundary under the "Preferred" case than under "Committed" case for 2015. This is shown at the Trans-Columbia crossings and at the farthest links of I-5, 99E, and Route 26. In all these cases the total number of person trips is higher for the "Preferred" case than it is for the "Committed" case. What's clearly going on here is Metro Black Box Fudge #17 to inflate LRT ridership figures, these being the only numbers the Metro Council or FTA ever looks at. Curiously enough, their summary shows 2,612 fewer person trips under the "Preferred" case than under the "Committed" case (9,613,842 as opposed to 9,616,454). Either this is a mistake or assumptions have been employed which mandate that slightly fewer trips will be made within the Urban Growth Boundary under the "Preferred" LRT case.

Comparing forecasts of competing scenarios for the same year while assuming a different number of trips for each has no justification. The reason given by Metro's forecasters for doing this was the "greater mobility" 2015 will have with the more extensive LRT system.

Yet, Metro's own forecast invalidates this specious reasoning. First, Metro forecasts fewer, not more, person trips under the "Preferred" case than under the "Committed" case from locations within the Urban Growth Boundary. Second, the forecast further finds more, not less, traffic congestion under the "Preferred" case. This greater "Preferred" traffic congestion would tend to diminish, not increase trip-making for the vast majority of trips made by auto. Against this the slight "Preferred" increase in transit ridership is insignificant.

The increase in both traffic and transit trips under the "Preferred" case is also due to the huge increase in park-and-ride trips that could be expected with a LRT system replacing direct bus service. That is, what is now only a bus trip (because one walks to the bus) becomes two trips: a LRT trip and an auto trip (from LRT to home). Metro gauged that the effect of East Side LRT was to double park-and-ride trips there so a similar impact is to be expected in the South/North Corridor.

These model results may also indicate another unintentional effect of imposing an LRT system: concentration of trips on major highways. Some modal diversion from bus to auto is likely because many people would find their travel times would be longer via LRT. With many bus routes eliminated, there would be some modal diversion from bus to auto (resulting in higher traffic volumes). At the same time, those who do transition from bus to LRT would be spatially concentrated: instead of several parallel bus routes there would be one highway LRT route.

D. Transit Ridership in 2015

Overall regional transit use would be only 3.2% of total weekday trips under the low budget "Committed" case. Metro's forecast shows that if we bear down, gird our loins, and make a supreme effort we might raise this transit share all the way to 4.0% under their "Preferred" case. That's with the South/North, Route 217, and Airport LRT lines. Getting that extra 0.8% would cost about $15 billion over 20 years. The extra 81,000 one-way transit trips daily would cost about $185,000 each. Metro's forecast that total weekday transit trips in the region would be 304,813 under "Committed" but 385,804 under "Preferred".

Opening the South/North and Airport LRT lines would reduce East Side LRT line ridership by nearly 19% at Lloyd Center (12% or less at other points). Roughly 1,000 MAX peak hour riders are forecast to divert to either the South/North LRT line or to increased bus service.

Metro forecasts the North LRT line to carry 3,076 outbound riders up Interstate Avenue just north of the Rose Quarter and 2,241 outbound riders on the South LRT line just south of the Ross Island Bridge. These volumes are in range of peak hour peak directional passenger flows on the existing East Side line presently. Under the "Committed" case (without South/North Light Rail) transit ridership in the I-5 Corridor of North Portland is forecasted to be about 80% as large as it would be with South/North Light Rail. I-205 transit ridership is forecasted to be much higher without the extra Light Rail lines.

None of the subsidiary LRT lines that Metro put into its "Preferred" case result in appreciable ridership. The Route 217 LRT line is forecast to have only 500 peak hour outbound riders south of downtown Beaverton. The Airport LRT line would carry only 222 more peak hour riders than would existing bus service. Nor do either of the two "forks" of the South LRT line in Clackamas County show much promise. The Oregon City fork carries only 409 riders into Oregon City while the Clackamas Town Center fork leaves downtown Milwaukie for CTC carrying only 266 riders.

Metro does forecast one LRT line, however, that gains substantial ridership under their "Preferred" case. The trouble is that this gain makes little sense. Inexplicably, they forecast that the West Side LRT line would have much greater ridership in 2015 the "Preferred" case than under the "Committed" case. They forecast this line to have 2,763 riders leaving the western edge of Downtown Portland under the "Preferred" case. Yet for the same year this same line under the "Committed" case is forecast to have only 1,615 riders -- only 58% of the "Preferred" ridership.

This is baffling. The West Side LRT line would be in existence under both 2015 cases. In the "Preferred" case for the East Side LRT line, Metro paradoxically forecasts a great ridership loss compared to the "Committed" cast. Yet, for the West Side LRT, ridership is forecast as going up !?! The West Side LRT increase for "Preferred" is odder still as one might expect this line to lose ridership to the new "Southwest" LRT line on Route 217.

This West Side LRT ridership increase may de due to the following:

1) Metro's assumption that a high number of Washington County commuters would use the West Side line to transfer to the new South/North LRT line (while East Side LRT riders wouldn't).

2) Metro's assumption that a high number of Washington County commuters would use the West Side line to transfer to the new Route 217 LRT line.

3) Metro's assumption that a high number of Airport Line riders would originate in Washington County; and

4) Metro's use of a much higher number of trips made overall in Washington County under the "Preferred" case than under "Committed" case for 2015;

All these assumptions are questionable. Even taken together they do not seem to add up to enough to explain the inexplicable boost to ridership the "Preferred" case confers on the West Side LRT line. There may be other Fudge Factors buried in the model here. Only further excavation will reveal what these may be.

E. The Forecast Versus "Alternative Analysis Findings"

Metro's forecast shows higher traffic congestion under their "Preferred" scheme compared to "Committed". Yet issued to its own Council this summer were "Briefing Materials" which show traffic congestion under a "High Transit" scenario to be lower than under "Committed". What's different ?

Metro's Draft Alternative Analysis Findings, dated July 16, 1997, were issued as "Briefing Materials for JPACT, MPAC, and the Metro Transportation Planning Committee". This report compares a "Committed" case for 2015 to a "High Transit" scenario, which may seem superficially similar to the "Preferred" case used in the forecast. They gave these results in their "Briefing Materials":

1) Transit as a percentage of total region person trips would go from 2.9% in 1994 to 4.3% under "High Transit" but only 3.2% under "Committed" (p. 107). (By way of comparison, the 1991 Southern California Origin-Destination Survey found that 3.5% of total Los Angeles County person trips were by transit).

2) To get that extra "High Transit" 1.2% would require 35 more light rail cars, 228 more buses, about fifty more miles of LRT track, and an extra $4 billion in operating costs and vehicle purchases over 20 years plus $11 billion in capital to build and finance the extra LRT lines. That's $15 billion to raise transit ridership 35% over 2015 "Committed" levels.

3) Motor vehicle hours of delay would be up 303% under "Committed" but would be up only 57-112% under the "High Transit" alternatives (p. 77); and

4) Highway travel times are lower, in some cases much lower, under the "High Transit" alternative compared to "Committed" (p. 27 & 77).

The "Briefing Materials" contained the following regarding "Motor Vehicle Alternatives Analysis" or highway improvements:

1) Highway improvements, costing up to $13.5 billion with up to 1,551 additional highway lane-miles over "Committed" levels are added to the "High Transit" scenario issued in the "Briefing Materials" (p. 59);

2) It is these highway improvements which reduce congestion and travel times -- the $13.5 billion reduces congested miles from 13% of the total under "Committed" to only 4.4% of the total and reduces vehicle hours of delay from 42,828 under "Committed" to 8,353 (p. 58) by adding 1.76 million lane-miles to the regional system (a 23% increase over "Committed").

What this information seems to tells us is the following. For less money than a "High Transit" program would cost to squeeze another 1.2% of person trips into transit, we could hold congestion and roadway congestion in 2015 down to 1994 levels. In other words, we can build our way out of congestion. But please don't tell the public that: it'll make Metro look bad for putting 90% plus of the money into light rail instead of putting into developing facilities that people would actually use.

What is different between the "Preferred" scheme used in the DEIS forecast and the "High Transit" scheme used in the "Briefing Materials" which seems to lower congestion are the massive highway improvements ? The answer is that subtly included in the "High Transit" scheme are highway improvements.

The secret ingredient in reducing congestion (and please, folks, let's keep this a secret): widening freeways and arterial roads and adding useful highway links. This is exactly the solution those traffic engineer squares were telling us back before we replaced them all with politically correct "high capacity transit" planners.

III. IMPACT ON SOUTHEASTERN TRAVEL CORRIDORS

Peak hour outbound traffic volumes are 7-11% higher on McLoughlin Boulevard in the Year 2015 with the "Preferred" South/North and other new LRT lines than in the "Committed" case without more LRT. As capacity severely limits traffic growth in the peak hour in the peak direction (shown in table), daily traffic growth would certainly be proportionally much larger.

Except when otherwise noted, all traffic volumes shown on these tables represent the afternoon peak hour outbound (peak direction) flow -- that is, traffic moving outbound from Downtown Portland. The afternoon peak hour is roughly 4:30 to 5:30 PM.

More Light Rail has a negligible impact on I-205. Peak hour traffic volumes are forecast to be slightly lower with the South/North LRT line in 2015 on I-205 approaching the Willamette River in Oregon City but slightly lower further north on I-205 near Johnson Creek Boulevard.

Traffic levels on roadways are similar or even higher under the "Preferred" case in spite of the much higher transit ridership forecast. Metro forecasts much higher transit ridership in with the McLoughlin Corridor South/North LRT line than in the "Committed" case, when only bus routes in mixed traffic will operate. This is not a direct comparison because a few Clackamas County bus lines that serve this area do not travel on McLoughlin Boulevard whereas with South/North LRT their ridership would be re-routed along McLoughlin.

In Metro's "2015 Preferred" case, the South LRT line forks into two lines: one to Oregon City and one to Clackamas Town Center. However, it is clear neither fork manages to pick up much ridership south and east of Milwaukie. The Oregon City fork carries only 452 peak hour riders (409 southbound and 43 northbound) as it enters the City while the Clackamas Town Center fork carries only 447 riders (266 eastbound and 181 westbound) as leaves the downtown area of Milwaukie for the Town Center. These are ridership volumes generally handled by bus routes.

IV. IMPACT ON SOUTHWESTERN TRAVEL CORRIDORS

Light Rail would significantly add to traffic congestion on I-5 and I-205 South. Peak hour traffic volumes southbound are forecasted to be 11-14% higher on I-5 in the Southwest in the Year 2015 with the addition of the South/North and Route 217 LRT lines than in the "Committed" case. Daily traffic growth would certainly be proportionally much larger. Traffic volumes eastbound are forecasted to be 21% higher on I-205 just east of I-5 in 2015 under the "Preferred" LRT case versus the "Committed" case. The Route 217 LRT line is forecast to have 500 peak hour outbound riders south of downtown Beaverton.

The "Preferred" case with all the new LRT lines results in considerably more traffic being added to the Pacific Highway (99W). Traffic on the Pacific Highway is between 600-1,100 vehicles per hour higher under the "Preferred" multi-LRT case than in the "Committed" (no more LRT) case. This ranges from 11% more traffic south of the Beaverton-Hillsdale Highway to an astonishing 57% more traffic north of the Tualatin Sherwood Road.

The "Preferred" case with more LRT lines results in slightly more traffic being added to State Street (Route 43) in Lake Oswego than the "Committed" case with no more LRT lines added.

Comparable transit ridership for Barbur Boulevard were unreadable except at the point shown south of the Beaverton-Hillsdale Highway. Existing volumes may be understated so the huge percentage growth they forecast for 2015 may be misleading. Interestingly, all of this growth in both cases is from increasing bus service. Under the "Preferred" case bus service is greatly increased so that even with substantial diversions to the Route 217 LRT line bus transit ridership goes up terrifically.

This is a microsmic example of their model's tendency, unwarranted as it may be, to assume demand will automatically increase to meet supply in transit service offered. It is also a good example of how an increase in bus service alone -- with NO Light Rail -- would lead to a massive increase in transit ridership, at least according to the assumptions fed into their model. An overall model run of no more Light Rail with a big increase in bus service -- equivalent to 2015 "Committed" with peak hour bus service increased -- would probably show higher transit ridership and lower traffic volumes than would their 2015 "Preferred" case.

V. IMPACT ON NORTHERN I-5 & I-205 TRAVEL CORRIDORS

Light Rail would add traffic to this already congested section of I-5. Peak hour traffic volumes are forecasted by Metro to be higher with the "Preferred" South/North LRT to Vancouver than in the "Committed" case without it in North Portland on I-5. This can be seen on both I-5 links in this area where numbers are visible in the Year 2015. The table also shows another tendency of Metro's forecast: to have lower volumes in the future than at present on some links. Such a decline does not seem realistic.

* Reading taken North of Columbia Boulevard in Portland, not on I-5 Bridge, where numbers unreadable.

If we believe Metro's assumptions, then 5.6% more traffic will be crossing the Columbia River in the peak hour in 2015 if we put in South/North light rail. Light Rail clearly does not reduce Trans-Columbia traffic congestion. South/North Light Rail is forecasted to make I-5 in Downtown Vancouver slightly worse but I-205 crossing the Columbia River slightly better. Both 2015 cases show a significant increase in Trans-Columbia peak hour flow with pretty minor differences between them.

* Total of several parallel transit routes on or near I-5.

Significantly, transit ridership over the I-205 Bridge is 177% higher without South/North LRT line (the "Committed" case) than with it. At the sample line given for the I-5 Corridor, "Committed" transit ridership without the South/North LRT line is about 80% as large as it would be under the "Preferred" case. (Metro's clearly been working hard on this key Corridor; in past forecasts the gap between total transit ridership with or without LRT was even narrower.) Overall transit ridership on this screenline (I-5 plus I-205) is 3,453 without the South/North LRT line (the "Committed" case) and 3,981 with LRT added; we get 85% of the "Preferred" transit ridership without building any more light rail with "Committed".

Here is another example of how an increase in bus service alone -- with NO Light Rail -- would lead to a real increase in transit ridership and a reduction in traffic. Where they've added LRT (I-5) in their "Preferred" case they get more traffic; where they don't add LRT under their "Preferred" case but instead increase bus service (I-205) they get less traffic.

Transit ridership over the I-5 Bridge is unreadable on the maps available so the closest transit volumes along the I-5 Corridor were used instead. Metro's number for the existing transit ridership over the I-205 Bridge is about a tenth of the real volume, one of several mistakes uncovered for existing volumes.

* Assumes standard 1.2 persons per Average Vehicle

Overall, Metro has 11.7% or 3,040 more people crossing this key screenline on all modes when it applies its "Preferred" case rather than the "Committed" case for 2015. Metro forecasts 1,158 more vehicles AND 1,651 more transit riders traveling over the Columbia River in the peak hour under their "Preferred" case than would be under the "Committed" case without the South/North LRT line. (This works out to be 15% higher Trans-Columbia transit ridership along with 5.6% more vehicular traffic). This is the biggest example of Metro is using a higher number of trips overall under the "Preferred" case than under "Committed" case to inflate their LRT ridership forecast for South/North LRT.

The addition of South/North Light Rail would result in hardly any reduction in traffic congestion on such key highways such as Route 30, Marine Drive, or State Route 14. Peak hour traffic volumes are forecasted to be virtually the same with or without the addition of the South/North and Airport LRT lines.

VI. IMPACT ON THE EAST SIDE TRAVEL CORRIDOR

Metro's "Preferred" case (with the new South/North and Airport Light Rail lines and a transit increase) would add more traffic to the already congested Banfield Freeway than would be added in the low budget "Committed" case which would have no more Light Rail. Those extra billions would worsen a corridor that has already seen a terrific traffic growth of over 50% since LRT was implemented here in 1986. Traffic growth would certainly be proportionally much larger in all other hours.

The fact that peak hour traffic growth is so low is due to the sheer capacity limitations of this freeway. Conditions would be so severe by 2015 that more traffic couldn't "fit" onto the road and some traffic would divert to other hours or other roads. However, the City of Portland is reducing capacity on those "other roads" that parallel the Banfield. This year it took a lane away from the Broadway and Weidler one-way couplet and studies are underway to remove through lanes and/or "calm" traffic (by slowing it down further) on other paralleling arterial routes.

* Easternmost points shown for both roads on printout

Metro is using a higher number of trips overall for Route 26 under the "Preferred" case or we have to include that, once again, the Metro "Preferred" case (South/North Light Rail) would add more traffic. There are clearly no benefits for I-84 or Route 26 east of the city.

The addition of South/North Light Rail would result in hardly any reduction in traffic congestion on Sandy Boulevard. Peak hour traffic volumes are forecasted to be virtually the same with or without the addition of the South/North and Airport LRT lines.

Metro's number for existing MAX peak hour ridership past Lloyd Center is only about 40% of the actual number -- one of numerous examples throughout this forecast of their inability to forecast even the past.

The imposition of the South/North LRT line would reduce East Side LRT line ridership by nearly 19% ! The is in spite of the fact that, according to Metro, MAX by Lloyd Center would have picked up at least 100 extra Airport Line riders under this "Preferred" case. Somehow 900-1,000 MAX peak hour riders disappear. (This is just as well; the volume projected with those extra 900-1,000 would put MAX ridership over capacity with two-car train sets.) Where do all those MAX riders go ?

Here we get to the big joke in Metro's forecast. There are only two places these vanished 900-1,000 can go. Most or all of them are diverted to the South/North LRT line. Or due to the increase of bus service under the "Preferred" case, most or all of them are diverted to bus service, reversing Tri-Met's September 1986 "MAX Inaugural" changes. The fact that the "Preferred" loss of ridership on the East Side LRT line drops as it goes further east (a 10% loss just east of Gateway), suggests a diversion to bus.

Possibility Number 2 -- diversion to buses -- is not hard to understand. Possibility Number 1 -- diversion to South/North LRT -- is harder to understand. If all 900-1,000 are part of the South/North LRT ridership those 900-1,000 could account for roughly 20% of total South/North LRT riders.

Is Metro playing a shell game with LRT riders ? If this is the case Metro is greatly exaggerating the ease of access that Clark County and eastern Clackamas County riders who now take East Side LRT would find in switching to the South/North LRT. There also simply aren't many East Side MAX riders who live anywhere near the South/North line. However, if this is what is happening we have a most curious situation: future South/North LRT ridership would consist of existing bus riders and existing LRT riders.

Metro forecasts a 2% reduction in peak hour traffic at Portland International Airport with the addition of the South/North and Airport LRT lines in 2015. So we'll have 98% of the traffic anyway and even this 2% difference is based on questionable assumptions and is well within the usual margin of error.

Metro's "Preferred" case consists of a few new LRT lines besides the South/North LRT line. One of the most interesting is their line to PDX, which is supposed to carry 8% of airport travelers plus a share of airport area employees and visitors. This Airport LRT line is forecast to carry 222 more peak hour riders than would the #12 bus (maybe 1,800 more daily). Even with the assumptions they have used to exaggerate LRT Airport line ridership, their projected volume is quite small. A bus service running every 10 minutes could easily handle this volume of people and luggage. The daily Airport line ridership would be about 2,900, about one ninth the East Side MAX ridership.

Peak hour traffic reduced at the airport would be 202 vehicles with the Airport LRT line. As they are forecasting 222 more transit riders to PDX than with existing bus service, it seems that they are assuming all these 222 extra Airport LRT riders would be diverted from autos and not from airport shuttle services. In reality, overall auto reduction would probably be less and a high proportion of Airport LRT riders would be diverted from high-occupancy airport vans.

VII. IMPACT ON THE WEST SIDE TRAVEL CORRIDOR

Metro's forecast makes absolutely clear that their "Preferred" case (with South/North Light Rail, Route 217, and Airport LRT lines) would add more traffic to the Sunset Freeway than would be the case in 2015 without these additional LRT lines. At all five links examined along the Sunset Freeway, the "Preferred" case results in more peak hour traffic. Just east of its interchange with Route 217, the "Preferred" case would add 14% more traffic than the "Committed" case. West of Murray Boulevard the "Preferred" case would add nearly 18% more traffic. Even at the western edge of the Metro area, the "Preferred" case would add 16% more traffic.

As both "Preferred" and "Committed" cases for 2015 include the West Side LRT line it seems puzzling that the "Preferred" case should have so much more peak hour traffic. Possible explanations for this are discussed in Section VI.

Metro's "Preferred" case (with South/North, Route 217, and Airport LRT lines) would result in hardly any discernible change in peak hour traffic on the Tualatin Valley Highway in Hillsboro.

Metro's "Preferred" case would add somewhat more peak hour traffic to the Beaverton-Hillsdale Highway in Portland and Beaverton. Metro's "Preferred" case would not result in much change in peak hour traffic on Cornell Road in Hillsboro: slightly more would leave Portland and slightly less would approach Hillsboro.

Both "Preferred" and "Committed" cases for 2015 include the West Side LRT line. Therefore, it seems odd that Metro forecasts a "Preferred" case with much higher ridership on the West Side LRT line than under the "Committed" case. This is especially so as they are simultaneously forecasting greater traffic along the Sunset Freeway under the "Preferred" case as well.

They are forecasting 500 westbound peak hour riders on their "Preferred" Route 217 line and another 170 outbound on the Airport LRT line. Therefore, an extra 600 passengers or so might be expected east in downtown Beaverton where the West Side and Route 217 lines would join. Yet inexplicably, Metro forecasts that the West Side LRT line would have greater ridership west of that junction with the Route 217 line. They forecast 828 more peak hour westbound riders to be on West Side LRT west of Murray Boulevard. Yet this number would include only a handful picked up from the Route 217 and Airport lines. Metro must be applying other assumptions to inflate West Side LRT ridership for the "Preferred" case or resorting to black magic.